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Abstract 
In contemporary neuroscientific and psychiatric research into schizophrenia, we can 
observe a shift in focus from the clinical dysfunctions (positive and negative symptoms) 
towards a mapping of the cognitive function. In this paper we look at a specific 
cognitive problem area in schizophrenic brain functioning, the Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex (ACC). We show what the ACC is, what it probably does and how this is 
relevant in research concerning certain psychiatric disorders. Then we explain the role 
of the ACC in choice anticipation. In this we underline the possible link between choice 
anticipation and the lack of ‘Error Related Negativity’ (ERN) in this specific area. 
Lastly we incorporate this approach to the problem of schizophrenic anticipation within 
the neuropsychoanalytical framework and the role it might play in the formation of 
hallucinations and delusion.   
Keywords: Schizophrenia, ACC, (Neuro)psychoanalysis, Anticipation, Delusion. 
1 The unapparent connection is more powerful than the apparent 
one.1  
In this publication I would like to present you with material which links the idea 
behind anticipation with the research concerning schizophrenia from a complex 
neuropsychoanalytical viewpoint. For this choice, I give three reasons.  
The first one is that the ideas underlying an complex anticipatory approach enrich 
any problem you put your mind to. It makes the model more natural, dynamic and from 
my own point of view more accessible to thought experiments and clinical applications. 
Although the model itself may become more difficult to translate into experimental 
research directly and you need an open mindedness not commonly found among 
scientists and philosophers nowadays, it will be worth it in the long run. 
Second of all, I am very interested in the neurology behind schizophrenia. As 
opposed to other mental ‘illnesses’ such as hysteria, neurasthenia, depression, 
                                                           
1 Herakleitos, quoted in Hippolytus, Refutations 
(http://community.middlebury.edu/~harris/Philosophy/heraclitus.pdf) 
  
personality disorders and the like, the brain has always seemed as the site where 
schizophrenia is supposed to be located. “In 1837, Dr. W.A.F. Browne, the best-known 
English psychiatrist of his generation, wrote: "Insanity, then, is inordinate or irregular, 
or impaired action of the mind, of the instincts, sentiments, intellectual, or perceptive 
powers, depending upon and produced by an organic change in the brain." In that same 
year, Dr. Amariah Brigham, one of the founders of American psychiatry, also wrote that 
insanity "is now considered a physical disorder, a disease of the brain."”2  
Only a handful of researchers have the courage to look beyond the actual locus of the 
problem in the brain and look at the complex connections between different cognitive or 
psychological phenomena and different brain states. Schizophrenia is a complex 
problem, so to do it justice we can only hope to find a very complex answer to this 
question, no matter what level of the schizophrenic question we want to address (be it 
the social, psychological or neurological level).  
Thirdly, as a psychotherapist, I work with schizophrenic patients on a daily basis. In 
this work, it is very remarkable to witness two very distinct phenomena. On the one 
hand, they seem to fail miserably when it comes to making realistic expectations about 
the future and their own place in it. On the other hand, they do not seem to stop 
anticipating events, which from a logical point of view can’t and won’t ever happen. 
These wrongly anticipated events are commonly known as delusions.  
Especially in the case of paranoid schizophrenia, these two quirks in the anticipatory 
process really stand out. Paranoid patients don’t seem to bother too much with the 
anticipation of real dangers and other possible stressful events (such as losing a job, a 
partner, a friend or even making certain specific errors in everyday life situations and 
the implications these might entail; things like crossing the road even). This makes them 
from a ‘normal’ point of view seem reckless, aloof or even outright demeaning in social 
situations. But when it comes down to their paranoid delusions themselves, they are 
very much aware of how the danger they fret is going to come and knock on their door. 
They know what the specific portents are of this imminent doom and what they will 
have to do to counter or accelerate this process. In short, from a clinical perspective 
paranoid patients lack a realistic anticipatory attitude and they make up for this through 
a paranoid anticipatory approach. 
In paranoid schizophrenia the process of anticipation has gone haywire, and no one 
understands how this has come about. One of the major advances that a 
psychoanalytical approach to this problem might have, is an insight in the logic behind 
(paranoid) delusions and hallucinations. They are not mere whim nor folly, there is a 
certain anticipatory logic behind it.  
To help a schizophrenic patient in a state of anticipatory anxiety is to understand 
what is going on in his mind, so as to anticipate what possible interventions might be 
able to alleviate the burden of this anguishing anticipatory process and the social 
turmoil that follows in its wake.    
                                                           
2 http://www.schizophrenia.com/family/disease.htm 
  
So, to keep things simple, in this paper we link the neurological approach to the 
problem of anticipation, haphazardly located for now in the anterior cingulate cortex, 
and look at where this avenue of thought leads us to.  
First we look at schizophrenia from a psychiatric point of view and comment upon 
the view of (ab)normality. Next, we discuss the Anterior Cingulate Cortex, followed by 
a look at the involvement of this brain area in anticipation. We then incorporate the 
ACC anticipation cortex within a psychoanalytical framework regarding psychosis to 
come to our conclusion about the ACC-anticipation-psychosis link. 
2 Schizophrenia, the ‘global brain disease’ in sickness and in health? 
From the first moment the term schizophrenia was first coined by Eugene Bleuler in 
1911, this group of mental disorders was seen as one of the most severe and pervasive, 
with a very pessimistic prognosis. Even Freud it is said deemed them almost untreatable 
at times (1911 [1910]). The severity of this illness is only matched by 
Alzheimers’dementia, which normally only manifests itself later in life. But, 
schizophrenia has its onset for most patients between the age of 18 and 25 years, where 
a subject should normally have his or her entire life before him. Before Bleuler in 1887, 
Emile Kraepelin named this group of patients the dementia praecox, those who 
irreversibly become demented too young because of their illness. 
Even in popular culture the term schizophrenia equals dangerously mad, people in 
need of being locked away for life. And for a great spell, this was actually the case, 
schizophrenic patients where locked away in asylums for the rest of their days. This 
view on schizophrenia continues up to this very day, where people with schizophrenia 
are seen as disordered and malfunctioning individuals.  
This approach is countered from a Lacanian psychoanalytical point of view by 
stating that schizophrenia is actually just a form of psychosis and that psychosis is a 
different biopsychosocial structure, another existential position alongside the ‘normal’ 
neurotic structure (Maleval, 2000b). Schizophrenia has its disadvantages and its 
benefits, but it should be measured or appraised in its own right.  
The question of developmental ‘normality’ does not come into play as such from a 
Lacanian point of view. The crux of psychoanalytical treatment for any patient is the 
specific subjective suffering and the questions surrounding it, which bring them into 
therapy. The normative diagnostics behind the reasons for this suffering come second, 
although they are important as avenues to approach the specific suffering, to understand 
it and to help alleviate it. In short, from a psychoanalytical point of view the cause of 
the subjective suffering is the main issue, not the question of (ab)normal thought or 
behaviour.  
So, from a psychiatric point of view now, what is schizophrenia? Schizophrenia is a 
group of psychotic disorders characterized by disturbances in thought, perception, 
affect, behaviour, and communication that last longer than 6 months. In the most 
frequently used psychiatric guide to mental illness, the DSM IV, a patient is deemed 
schizophrenic if the following criteria are met. 
  
DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia3  
Characteristic symptoms: Two or more of the following, each present for a 
significant portion of time during a one-month period: Delusions, hallucinations, 
disorganised speech (eg, frequent derailment or incoherence), grossly disorganised or 
catatonic behaviour, negative symptoms (ie, affective flattening, alogia, or avolition). 
Only one of these symptoms is required if delusions are bizarre or hallucinations consist 
of a voice keeping up a running commentary on the person’s behaviour or thoughts, or 
two or more voices conversing with each other. Social/occupational dysfunction: Since 
the onset of the disturbance, one or more major areas of functioning, such as work, 
interpersonal relations, or self-care, are markedly below the level previously achieved. 
Duration: Continuous signs of the disturbance persist for at least six months. This six-
month period must include at least one month of symptoms (or less if successfully 
treated) that meet the characteristic symptoms.  
The DSM IV further specifies 4 Subtypes: Paranoid Type, Catatonic Type, 
Disorganized Type, Undifferentiated Type and the Residual Type.4 
2.1 Positive and negative symptoms: the dopamine hypothesis and beyond? 
For all forms of schizophrenia, psychiatrists since Bleuler usually divide the 
symptoms in positive5 and negative6. These symptoms are then treated with 
medications, commonly known as neuroleptics. These are divided into two groups: 
typical7 and the atypical8. The typical ones are all strict dopamine antagonists, meaning 
                                                           
3 http://www.mja.com.au/public/mentalhealth/articles/hustig/husbox1.html 
4 Also, schizophrenia should be differentiated from psychotic disorder due to a general medical condition, 
delirium, or dementia; substance-induced psychotic disorder; substance-induced delirium; substance-
induced persisting dementia; substance-related disorders; mood disorder with psychotic features; 
schizoaffective disorder; depressive disorder not otherwise specified; bipolar disorder not otherwise 
specified; mood disorder with catatonic features; schizophreniform disorder; brief psychotic disorder; 
delusional disorder; psychotic disorder not otherwise specified; pervasive developmental disorders (e.g., 
autistic disorder); childhood presentations combining disorganized speech (from a communication 
disorder) and disorganized behavior (from Attention-Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder); schizotypal 
personality disorder; schizoid personality disorder; paranoid personality disorder. (see, 
http://www.mentalhealth.com/dis1/p21-ps01.html) 
5 delusions, hallucinations, disordered thought and disorganized speech. 
6 flat affect, anhedonia, social withdrawal, emotional detachment, cognitive deficits and poverty of speech 
7 Typical neuroleptics are generally D2 antagonists. D2 antagonists are particularly effective in treating the 
positive symptoms of schizophrenia. Adverse side-effects are common with dopamine antagonists due to 
the blockade of dopamine receptors within the neostriatum. Major side-effects include dystonias (acute 
spasms), Parkinsonism (bradykinesia, shuffling gait, muscular rigidity, and tremor), and akathisia (motor 
restlessness). Tardive dyskinesia is the term used to characterize a neurological disorder caused by long-
term treatments with classical neuroleptics. Tardive dyskinesia is particularly associated with abnormal 
movements of the hands and face.  
8 Since the 1960’s, several new compounds have been developed with unique properties. Collectively, 
these compounds are referred to as atypical neuroleptics, that have an effect not only of D2 but also on the 
serotinin receptors in the brain for example. Atypical neuroleptics are generally (more) effective in 
treating both the positive and negative symptoms of schizophrenia and with fewer side effects or so it is 
believed. The lack of extrapyramidal side effects may be due in part to its potent anticholinergic effects, 
in addition to a high affinity for 5-HT2 (serotonin) receptors. Atypical neuroleptics generally have high 
  
that they block dopamine in certain parts of the brain.9 Four major dopamine pathways 
are distinguished: nigrostriatal (involved in movement and Parkinson’s disease), 
mesocortical (alterations in this are supposed to give rise to the negative symptoms), 
mesolimbic ( these are the main psychiatric focus point as they are seen to give rise to 
the positive symptoms) tuberoinfundibular pathway (this tract controls the prolactin 
secretion from the anterior pituitary gland) 
The success of these medicines, combined with an insight into their function in the 
brain has lead to a theory known as the dopamine hypothesis: schizophrenia as a whole 
is to be understood as a problem in the dopamine circuitry only, D1 and D2 receptors, 
because blocking these (especially D2) greatly reduce the positive symptoms. This 
seems to be at odds with recent findings in the working mechanisms of atypical 
neuroleptics and further brain research (Dolan et al, 1995; Coyle, 2006; Abi Dargham, 
2004). 
Other neurotransmitters and their receptors have also been shown to play a crucial 
role in schizophrenia: acetylcholine, glutamate (NMDA), GABA, cannabinoid, nicotinic 
and opioid receptors, for example (Coyle, 2006; Benes et al, 2001).  
All this leads to the conclusion that a limited look at the working mechanisms behind 
neuroleptics as an explanatory framework for schizophrenia is flawed at best. We need a 
broader perspective to place the relevance of the inner workings of dopamine and its 
link to positive symptoms in a meta-theory of schizophrenia. For this enterprise we need 
more building blocks and more possible ways to combine them. Crucial within this 
framework is that the positive symptoms themselves are looked at from another angle.  
The positive symptoms may be very bizarre and hard to follow, but perhaps they are 
not the core of the schizophrenic problem. Yet they are usually the reason why a 
schizophrenic patient is sent into treatment, because they seem out of their mind. One 
very important focal point still for most psychiatrists is to eradicate these positive 
symptoms, which may not be necessary. It can’t be or at least it shouldn’t be the goal to 
‘normalize’ schizophrenics, unless it is their own goal in life. Most patients are only 
hampered by their hallucinations and/or delusions if they are threatening or depressive 
in nature, or if these cause social strife in interpersonal interaction. To me, trying to 
annihilate them because they are the symptoms par excellence of a sick mind is missing 
the point at best, unethical at worst.   
2.2 Cognitive deficits: the broader perspective, or is it? 
In recent decades a lot of research has gone into the cognitive functioning of 
schizophrenic patients (Brazo et al, 2002). This has lead to the idea that the cognitive 
                                                                                                                                                                              
affinity for 5-HT2, D2, M1, and/or H1 receptors. With the discovery of multiple subtypes of dopamine 
receptors, recent efforts have focused on the development of D3 and D4 antagonists. D3 receptors are 
found at higher levels in the limbic system than in the striatum, suggesting that D3 antagonists might be 
useful neuroleptics with a reduced incidence of extrapyramidal side effects. 
9Dopamine pathways project from the mesencephalon (ventral tegmental area) to the frontal cortex 
(mesocortical projection, D1 group) and to the cingulate cortex, amygdala, lateral septum and the 
olfactory bulbs (mesolimbic projection, D2 group). These pathways seem to control cognitive function 
and emotion and give rise to the common symptoms of schizophrenia.  
  
deficits in schizophrenia are not immediately linked to the positive and negative 
symptoms, but that they are a category all by themselves.  
The most common cited deficits are in working memory, attention/vigilance, verbal 
learning and memory, visual learning and memory, reasoning and problem solving,  
speed of processing and social cognition.10 All of these seem severely damaged in 
schizophrenia. Furthermore, research in longitudinal studies and twin research has 
shown that the illness itself is detrimental to cognitive functioning (Bressler, 2003; 
Harvey et al, 1997). Schizophrenic patients perform worse -cognitively speaking- after 
the onset of the disease than before and an affected twin scores lower on cognitive tests 
than the unaffected twin (Goldberg, 1990). Overall, this has lead to the conclusion that 
schizophrenia is also a cognitive disease, that a psychotic breakdown is neurotoxic even 
and that schizophrenic subjects are handicapped because of their erroneous psychotic 
convictions and cognitive decline (Heinrichs et al, 1998). I personally believe this 
statement is rather blunt, verging on academic and clinical naivety. Two biases greatly 
influence this debate.  
The first, which I would like to call the normative bias, is the view that schizophrenia 
is a deficit in and of itself. It is only a deficit when compared to ‘normal’ individuals, 
and who makes up these norms and for what reason? This approach starts off from the 
accepted idea that the brain is a normative thing, and that certain differences in 
cognitive brain processes are transparently linked to mental aberrations or social 
inadequacies. Anyone truly looking at brain functioning knows that there are a million 
reasons why a person could be dysfunctional in certain situations. From my own 
therapeutic experience with these patients, I must say that it seems completely biased, 
you need a better picture at the interactions between these specific deficits and their 
importance in certain social or psychological situations, not just in test situations based 
on some kind of normative benchmark.  
The second bias I call the psychiatric bias, is that the people usually included in this 
research are patients in institutions, people who have come into trouble because of 
certain problems in their social and/or mental functioning. This is a very specific 
subgroup of what is probably a large population of people with a certain psychotic 
vulnerability. Only those caught up in the psychiatric web are seen as the schizophrenic 
population, where this is probably not true as is shown in numerous epidemiological 
studies (Stefanis et al, 2002; Johns et al, 2001). Moreover, what is commonly labeled as 
the schizophrenic disease is probably not a homogeneous group of patients (Weiser et 
al, 2005). Again, there are a lot of reasons (social, psychological, neurological) how 
someone could come to have the positive and/or negative symptoms of schizophrenia 
and maybe some schizophrenics do not even have these symptoms as such (Myin-
Germeys et al, 2003).  
                                                           
10 as measured with the Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological Status (RBANS), 
The Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia (BACS), or as stated in the Measurement and 
Treatment Research to Improve Cognition in Schizophrenia (MATRICS) project: Speed of Processing, 
Attention/Vigilance, Nonverbal attention,Verbal Learning and Memory, Visual Learning and Memory, 
Reasoning and Problem Solving and Social Cognition (http://www.matrics.ucla.edu). 
  
Concluding this lengthy introduction to schizophrenia, let’s sum up our main 
pretences and focal points.  
Right of the bat, schizophrenia is not a disease. It is a complex structure and anyone 
truly looking at this problem should feel humbled by the degree of its complexity.  
Second, schizophrenia is different and should be understood in its own right, 
according to its own criteria. It is useless to impose some kind of normative approach 
which might lose track of the problem at hand, trying to understand schizophrenia and 
schizophrenic patients in particular.  
Third and last, schizophrenia is not at all a stable or fixed problem. Symptoms 
change over time as people change and adapt over time. When dealing with 
schizophrenia, we should always remember that we are talking about people in 
interaction with their environment, trying to make the best of things. We need a 
viewpoint which takes change and chaos into account. Complex anticipatory models do 
just that, as we will try to show in part 4.  
3 The anterior cingulate cortex: knowing when you’re wrong? 
Numerous scientific studies with schizophrenic and other patients have shown the 
functioning of the Anterior Cingulate Cortex is noteworthy. The ACC (BA 24-32) is a 
part of our neocortex, on the medial surface of the frontal lobes, right over the corpus 
callosum. At first it was thought that it was actually not a part of the neocortex at all, but 
an older subcortical part of our limbic system (Allman, 2002). More recent research has 
shown that this is not the case. 
The ACC is richly interconnected with a lot of other functional areas.11 The most 
important are the prefrontal cortex (PFC), notably the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DPFC)12, the (pre)motor cortex (PMC), the Parietal Cortex (PPC) and subcortically 
with the thalamus, the amygdala, the hippocampus and the cerebellum (Wang et al, 
2004; McDonald et al, 2000).  
EEG and fMRI studies have shown that the ACC consists of two distinct functional 
parts, the Caudal ACC and the Rostral ACC, where the Caudal ACC is more involved 
in cognitive functions, whereas the Rostral ACC is more involved when it comes down 
to emotional appraisal as such (Laurens et al, 2003; van Veen et al, 2002, ). Further data 
suggest that these two parts are richly interconnected, which leads to the hypothesis that 
the ACC is partly responsible for linking cognition and affect (Fan et al, 2003). 
Now we know a bit more as to where the ACC is located and what it is linked to, 
what is its function? In the early ‘90s both Falkenstein and Gehring, using ERP 
                                                           
11 In the ACC of humans and the great apes spindle neurons were found. These distinct neurons are 
probably projection neurons, sending and receiving stimuli from a wide array of other brain areas. These 
spindle neurons are dopamine receptive in nature, are only visible after the first four months after birth 
and they seem to announce the development of the maturation enhancements of attention. It wouldn’t 
surprise me if in these spindle neurons the clue could be found as to where the developmental differences 
in schizophrenia could be found (Nimchinsky et al, 1995). 
12 Space limitations force us to leave the link between the ACC and the DPFC in the dark, although I 
cannot begin to stress the relevance of this enterprise. Combined they provide us with an explanatory 
framework beyond measure (Mc Donald et al, 2000).  
  
research, discovered that a certain negative brainwave pattern occurred in the EEG 
when a subject performs a mistake in an experimental task.13 
This pattern has been dubbed the error negativity (Ne) or Error Related Negativity 
(ERN). It seems to stem from the frontocentral part of the brain, near the ACC. This has 
lead to the hypothesis that the ACC is involved in action monitoring, more notably 
when errors have been performed.  
From this point on a whole corpus of literature has been established to further 
extrapolate on this point and to bring some of these rather conflicting data results (from 
ERN and fMRI results) within a logical framework (van Veen et al, 2002b; Mathalon et 
al, 2003). Some say that the ACC is an action monitor for errors, providing information 
to other areas; other see it as a top-down control area in itself (Liddle, 2001; Botvinick 
et al, 2004; Erickson et al, 2004; Carter et al, 1998; Paulus et al 2002; Luks et al, 2002; 
Fan et al, 2003). They might just both be right, as we will come to see later on. 
From the viewpoint of schizophrenia research, the ERN and the ACC functioning 
have received a lot of attention too, because the ERN pattern does not occur when 
schizophrenic patients make an error in an experimental task, at least not in the same 
way as ‘normal’ subjects (Nordhall et al, 2001). This, taken together with the 
popularisation of the ERN-ACC link as the brain’s ‘Oops’ function has lead to the 
psychiatric cognitive hypothesis that schizophrenics don’t know that they make a 
mistake, that they don’t feel it as such. In short, schizophrenics are social error prone 
misfits and the ERN-ACC dysfunction explains it. Speaking to any schizophrenic 
patient will show you that this caricature hypothesis is flawed at best. They don’t react 
on the spot, but the onslaught of their delusional reactions comes later on (see part 5).  
Any delusional story they tell you is a testimony to the fact that they react differently, 
but that they react nonetheless, albeit not in the way we ‘normal’ people usually do. At 
the core of any delusion lies a erroneous conflict within the subject or with its 
environment, a place where a certain solution was expected, even longed for, but not 
presented as such, so they invent their own solution. 
What is wrong then with the ERN-ACC hypothesis towards schizophrenia? First, the 
reductionist interpretational context is flawed. When you look at the brain as a problem 
solver, you can never look at it as if it is a linear computing machine. Although the ERN 
in the ACC is a very salient feature of our brain functions and of the difference in brain 
processing in schizophrenia, it is and remains a complex issue that cannot be understood 
too simplistically. The ACC is a very complex part of our very complex brain. The ERN 
not occurring after making a mistake does not lead to the conclusion that schizophrenics 
are not able to see faults on the spot, the only allowed conclusion according to me is that 
their brain reacts in another way, as is shown in ERP and fMRI research. In recent years 
an entire wealth of other features of the ACC have been discovered, most notably its 
role in mediating between cognition and affect, its role in reward dependent tasks, its 
role in the inscription of data in long term memory, the distinction in self/not-self in 
relation to the mirror neurons et cetera.14 (Arbib et al, 2005; Lane et al, 1997; Wang et 
                                                           
13 http://www-personal.umich.edu/~wgehring/intro.html 
14 A very recent study by Fellows and Farah (2005) has even shown that the ACC may not be necessary 
for cognitive control at all in people with cerebral damage to the ACC itself. Their problems are more 
  
al, 2004; van Veen et al, 2002, 2002b) The ERN (dys)function should take these other 
features and the interrelations between these new discoveries into account, especially 
when studying schizophrenia. The brain is not a computer and schizophrenics aren’t 
robots, although some of them believe otherwise themselves. 
Second, the relativistic temporal context interaction is biased. The ERN seems to 
occur only after an error has been made, but some data suggest that the ERN also occurs 
when mistakes are likely to occur, in anticipation (Luks et al, 2002). Furthermore, Error 
rate and outcome predictability affect neural activation in prefrontal cortex and anterior 
cingulate during decision-making, which point at the role the context plays for certain 
specific brain phenomena (Erickson, 2004). You could call this the error prone 
environment interactions. Furthermore, the N2 pattern –also frontocentral, probably also 
stemming from the ACC- occurs prior to a correct conflict resolution in a task, where 
the ERN is usually shown after an error has occurred (van Veen et al, 2002b). The 
interactions between both are not well understood, nor studied.  
To me, it is fascinating that both functions –anticipating success and (anticipatory 
and posterior) reacting to error- are located in the same part of the brain as processing 
attention, memory, motivation and emotional appraisal. It makes more sense that our 
brain should look at upcoming events from a relevant point of view for the system itself, 
taking into account previous reactions and possible future consequences (see part 4). 
What are the consequences of my (re)actions for me as a subject, what are my feelings 
towards this?  
We are not built to perform well in relation to irrelevant stimuli, we are built to 
survive in an error prone environment with dire consequences if we falter or fail. Recent 
research into pain shows that the expectation of pain (for ourselves or for others) causes 
massive innervation in the ACC, which goes to show (Buchel et al, 2002; Jackson et al, 
2005). 
4 The ACC anticipation hypothesis: doubting that you’re right!  
What is wrong with the model up until now? Almost everybody looking at the 
working of the ACC and the role of ERN in it takes a very matter of fact attitude 
towards the problem: if the ERN occurs, then we know that we have made an error. In 
reality, it is not as easy. We  need a broader context and a mapping of the subject 
environment interactions. 
My first hypothesis: The ACC and its function is actually that part of the brain which 
evaluates differences in the constant temporal flux which makes up our subjective 
awareness. It seems that our brain has the capacity to distinguish between correct and 
incorrect information and to evaluate its own role in it.  
From a psychoanalytical point of view, this function is crucial. In 1925, Freud wrote 
a very peculiar short text on this subject, and Lacan throughout his work has always 
hammered on the importance of our capacity to negate information and our own role in 
                                                                                                                                                                              
linked to motivational problems and reward expectancy. How to explain that from a reductionist 
viewpoint of the ERN? 
  
it (Freud, 1925h). Alongside the ideas of repression and the discovery of the 
unconscious complex phenomena, negation is seen as a crucial human capacity, both for 
subjective development as for our use of language (Ver Eecke, 2006 ).  
My second hypothesis: I personally believe that the ACC is the locus in our brain 
where the distinction between (pre)conscious affirmation (bejahung) and conscious 
negation (verneinung) over time is made. According to me, it is all the ACC might be 
doing, it takes possible error into account, it tells us that we may be right, but we might 
be wrong. Some have compared the function of the ACC to an exclamation mark, the 
brain’s ‘Oops!’ or ‘Damn!’ function. I on the other hand would compare it to a question 
mark, the ‘Huh?’ or ‘what the…?’ function.15    
How does this relate to what we have discussed so far? In a recent article Quintana et 
al (2004) investigated the ACC dysfunction in choice anticipation in schizophrenia. 
They discovered that in ‘normal’ subjects the ACC activation was high in response 
anticipation, but not when these subject had to remember a certain percept. While in 
schizophrenic subjects it was the other way around, no significant ACC activation in 
anticipation, activation when remembering a percept. 
They also discovered that there was a significant influence in this process if the 
anticipated or remembered percept was a colour dot or a face diagram. In anticipation 
with the normal subjects the colour dots yielded more activation than the faces. In 
remembering in schizophrenia the facial diagrams resulted in more activation than the 
dots, which leads to the speculation that the saliency and the relevance of the stimulus is 
also important (irrelevant colour dots or symbols of expressed emotion in the face 
diagrams). Because the results from this experiment were obtained with fMRI, it is 
impossible to tell if this activation was a Ne or an N2 wave pattern. We can only say that 
there was a distinction in activation as such.16 
Nevertheless, speculating on the information thus far, I would like to propose a third 
hypothesis concerning the ACC, negation and anticipation. In a previous paper, I made 
a distinction between three forms of anticipation: real, imaginary and symbolic (De 
Grave, 2004). 
Real anticipation is to be seen as the drive, the libido or the state of bodily arousal in 
expectation. The body prepares itself for a future event. “I feel A, so B must be coming 
on.” Imaginary anticipation is the expectation of a certain percept following another 
percept, based on a previously learned link between the two. “If A was first seen and B 
followed, then you anticipate that after the presentation of A, B will follow.” Imaginary 
anticipation is usually the one people hint at when using the word anticipation. The hard 
one to grasp is symbolic anticipation, which is the ambiguous subjective interpretation 
of what happens now, and what possible future states this might lead to without the 
immediate certainty of what the future is going to be.  
                                                           
15 Since the ACC is also the mediator between affect and cognition, the role of distinguishing between 
right and wrong might have far-reaching consequences if we add these two functions up. Knowing what 
is right or wrong is also a bodily state, an emotional appraisal. 
16 Throughout almost all ACC investigation, we see a clash between results from fMRI and ERN. Few 
studies combine the two. 
  
“If A is the case, then …?” Symbolic anticipation starts off from lack of certainty 
about future states and is based on conventions, beliefs and convictions, derived from 
social symbolic interactions with others. If A is the case, then we all agree upon the fact 
that B should follow.  
Language itself is probably the best example of symbolic anticipation. No signifier or 
word means anything in and of itself, it only generates its meaning through the context 
of other signifiers and subjects uttering them. Symbolic anticipation is the anticipation 
of certainty of meaning over time, with a lack of certainty at this moment in time. To 
me, it is the true and exclusively human complex form of anticipation. It is symbolic 
anticipation which makes up our common sense view of reality, which is nothing short 
of believing that you know what to expect based on social interaction. (Lacan, 1945).  
Third hypothesis: The ERN is the feeling (real) that something which a subject sees 
or does (imaginary) does not lead to the anticipated result (symbolic).  
Combining these three forms of anticipation, I speculate that the ACC might be the 
anticipatory interface where the real, imaginary and symbolic are intertwined to create 
the whole of existential anticipatory awareness. It entails being a certain way at a 
specific point in time, in relation to our remembered past and anticipated future. Some 
have named the ACC the interface between emotion and cognition and I think that this 
is true if we add that it links emotion and cognition into a meaningful event over time.  
Mostly, this is a process we are not aware of, since mostly our beliefs and 
expectancies are seemingly correct. We only notice its function when it goes wrong, and 
that is where the ERN in ‘normal’ subjects comes into play. Of course, this hypothesis 
is overly speculative, but I believe it could result in a few novel avenues of thought, 
experimental research and clinical applications. 
5 The collapse of reality: schizophrenic anticipation and delusion 
Experimental research has clearly shown that the brain wave pattern representing the 
ERN function in the ACC in schizophrenia is mostly blunted. According to me, this 
doesn’t say anything in its own right besides the fact that in schizophrenia, the brain 
react differently when making a mistake than in ‘normal’ individuals. But it is important 
nonetheless. 
From a Lacanian diagnostical point of view towards psychosis and schizophrenia, the 
diagnosis is formed on the basis of certain language disorders, certain peculiar social 
ties, a special way of experiencing the body and the bodily states (Maleval 2000a,b). All 
this is tied up in a theorem developed by Lacan named the forclusion of the primordial 
signifier (Name-of-the-Father) (Lacan, 1957; Maleval 2000a). Although it is a very 
difficult theorem to understand, for this paper it is only necessary that Lacan stated that 
for psychotic subjects language works in a different way than in neurosis, based on 
another existential position towards the Other (De Grave, 2006). 
In other words, what is important here is that for psychotic individuals language is 
not imbedded in the common sense idea we all share that words represent what we 
believe them to represent. A psychotic subject doesn’t accept language as the shared 
belief system, it is forcluded (Freud named this verwerfung, a function next to 
  
verleugnung and verneinung (Maleval, 2000a; Lacan, 1957; Freud, 1911c, 1918b, 
1924e, 1940e)). 
 This has far-reaching consequences, since everybody needs to be able to 
communicate in life to survive, be able to remember past errors to learn from them and 
to know what to expect from the future so as not to be fixed in a harrowing 
unpredictable universe.  
From a psychoanalytical point of view delusions in schizophrenia function as these 
ersatz anchor points, ways to distil a certain logic out of the events that happen in and 
around a psychotic individual (Maleval, 2000b). They are delusional because they are 
not tightly caught up in the network of symbols we all know as our shared reality. 
Delusions are a highly personal logical framework where things don’t fit in.  
To me, schizophrenic delusion should be understood as a form of direct 
interpretation. You think something and it is true, you feel something and it is true. 
There is no middle ground for taking the possible erroneous character of your beliefs 
and convictions into account.  
We all know that our common sense reality is a lie or a fantasy up to a certain 
degree, words don’t mean anything as such for example. But it is not strictly speaking 
our own lie, we didn’t invent the words, they are just borrowed. So we play along and 
pretend that it is true. It seems to work fine. But if your perception of reality is not based 
on this common sense lie, you have nothing to fall back on. This is exactly the problem 
in schizophrenia according to me. 
If we take the functioning of the ACC and the lack or blunting of ERN into account 
in this matter, we must say that schizophrenics may not be aware of mistakes as we are, 
but that is actually very logical if we look at it from the psychoanalytical point of view 
on delusions. They live in another symbolic universe than we do, with other rules and 
laws. Although they try to cope with the stresses everyday life imposes on us all, they 
take a very different approach to this. A lot of the time, they just do what is asked of 
them, because it is asked. In this, motivation for acts, even in experiments, is almost 
entirely external. This does not make it impossible to communicate with each other if 
we accept that sometimes we cannot understand each other.  
To me, plain and simple as a psychoanalyst, it is clear that in my everyday work with 
schizophrenic patients that they are not capable of anticipating a possible future as I am. 
They long for and they fret a different future which is not my own. They react 
differently. When they come unto our ward in a state of anxiety they are clearly 
different. Neuroleptics as dopamine antagonists do their work at stripping away their 
awkwardness (positive symptoms). I am not against medication, quite the contrary, but 
in giving medication that alters someone’s built-in expectation schemas, we should be 
very careful, maybe we are taking away someone’s own personal even intimate 
reference manual to understand the world and their own role in it. (Zirnheld et al, 2004) 
If you know that the ACC’s primary neurotransmitter is dopamine, you should think 
twice when administering a high dose of dopamine antagonists to solve the problem  
(Suhara et al, 2002; Nordhal et al, 2001). You might just be taking away a person’s 
capacity to anticipate any future, delusional or not. 
  
Clearly, schizophrenics on the whole mostly do not know on a conscious level why 
they have performed the acts that have brought them into trouble in the first place, they 
often don’t see the problem. But their delusional framework is a testimony to the fact 
that they do react very sensibly, even on the spot, but differently. They are busy trying 
to piece together the missing parts, the things other people tell them are out of order, 
unhinged, unbecoming in that place, at that time.  
To the outside world it seems as if time and logic have collapsed into nonsense, to 
them all forms of understanding have imploded into the magnificent insight which 
makes up their delusion. In this imploded reality everything is linked with everything, 
nothing can be seen loose from another fact. In all patients I have had the pleasure to 
speak to in length, this element of implosion of reality is present as a strange attractor in 
their delusional framework (Bazan et al, 2003). 
In such a collapsed universe it is difficult to see mistakes or error, because there is 
always a reason why the thought or the action could be right. Schizophrenics are caught 
up into an self-referential here and now with few possible ways of negating what is 
going on inside their mind (Ver Eecke, 2006). It is up to us as therapists to stretch this 
delusional form of all too direct interpretation out into an debatable temporal form of 
cognition, by standing next to them and placing the punctuation marks in the debate 
about their delusion. It is not that their delusions are wrong per se, the fact is that they 
could be wrong, just like any other thought anybody might have. In this we are all equal 
and in this we can find a middle ground between ‘normality’ and schizophrenia. The 
work with my patients heartens me that this is a possible endeavour. 
6 Conclusion: delusions of grandeur 
In this paper I have argued against a very strict interpretation of the ACC dysfunction 
in schizophrenia. The ACC clearly does something different in schizophrenia, as is 
shown in the blunted ERN, but that does not mean it doesn’t work, or that its function is 
abnormal. It all depends on the reference background as to what you expect the ACC to 
be doing in a certain case.  
With my speculations concerning delusional anticipation and the ACC, I may be 
dead wrong. It remains to be proven that there is actually a link between the two. All I 
am saying is that it is an interesting avenue of thought and possible experimentation. 
For this enterprise, you need to respect the delusions for what they might be, not just a 
symptom of a severely diseased brain, but an alternative reaction to a certain stimulus 
over time, another form of symbolic anticipation. 
As a therapist it is my job to try and better understand  my patients, so as to be able 
to try and help them better. A normative stance doesn’t fit into this picture, condemning 
because of their frame of mind is wrong. In this paper I have tried to show that this 
mind set of respecting the formations of the mind for what they are, might prove 
beneficial in other fields of dealing with schizophrenia: psychiatry, neurology, 
linguistics,… The relatively young branch of science named neuropsychoanalysis  
should take it upon itself to bring the qualities of psychoanalysis to the fore within the 
field of neuroscience, as a form of critique, but also as a clinical guideline where 
  
interesting fields of research are waiting to be discovered. I hope that I have conveyed 
some of the fervour in this project concerning the ACC and schizophrenic 
anticipation/delusion. 
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